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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
PERSONS WITH AIDS
Arthur S. Leonard*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), a condition
which renders the human immune system incapable of defending
against certain unusual fatal illnesses, was first diagnosed as a distinct
disease entity in 1981.' By April, 1985, the United States Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) had reported almost 10,000 confirmed cases of
the most severe form of this condition in the United States.2 Informed
observers speculate that up to ten times as many people suffer from
milder forms of the syndrome, and an undetermined portion of those
will develop the full, usually fatal, syndrome.' Because the mortality
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.S., Cornell University (1974); J.D.,
Harvard Law School (1977). The author wishes to acknowledge with appreciation the support of
the administration and the trustees of New York Law School in providing a faculty research grant
to underwrite work on this article during the summer of 1984 and the services of a student research assistant, Gary Stein, during the 1983 fall term.
I. Although it now appears that isolated cases of AIDS were occurring in the United States
as early as 1979, the general recognition of AIDS as a distinct disease entity probably dates to
1981, when the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) began to investigate reports of unusual
opportunistic infections in New York and California. The first official reporting on AIDS was
contained in CDC's Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, June 5, 1981 [hereinafter cited as
MMWRJ. Foege, The National Pattern of AIDS, in THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 7 (K. Cahill ed. 1983).
See generally A. FETTNER & W. CHECK, THE TRUTH ABOUT AIDS (1984). For a concise account
of the history of the epidemic through early 1984, see Comment, AIDS: A Legal Epidemic?, 17
AKRON L. REV. 717, 718-22 (1984).
2. As of September 24, 1984, the CDC had counted 6,122 cases of AIDS. N.Y. Native,
Oct. 8, 1984, at 17. By October 22, 1984, the CDC count had reached 6,517, an increase of
almost 400 cases in one month. N.Y. Native, Nov. 5, 1984, at 16. (The New York Native is a
biweekly newspaper serving the New York City metropolitan gay and lesbian community. Unlike
the "mainstream" press in this area, which has provided only sporadic reporting on AIDS, the
Native has published the latest CDC statistics, interviews with scientists engaged in AIDS research, and lengthy columns by doctors and other scientific experts reporting and analyzing new
developments, in virtually every issue since the AIDS epidemic began to receive notice in the gay
community.) In February 1985, as controversy developed over a blood test for antibodies to
HTLV-1ll virus, the CDC reported that its AIDS case count had passed eight thousand. Altman,
U.S. Delays Licensing Blood Test to Detect AIDS, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1985, at B16, col. 3. On
April 8, 1985, the CDC reported that the count had reached 9,405. N.Y. Native, April 22, 1985,
at 13.
3. Gay Men's Health Crisis, Inc., Health Letter No. 4, at I (Aug. 1984) [hereinafter cited
as GMHC-4]. Gay Men's Health Crisis, Inc., is a nonprofit organization formed in 1982 by gay
men in New York City concerned with the lack of attention paid to the growing medical crisis of
AIDS by the government and the medical research establishment. Among its activities of patient
services, counseling, testifying before agencies on AIDS-related issues, and public education,
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rate for persons with CDC-defined AIDS is very high," the progress of
the disease is disfiguring and painful, and the means by which the disease is transmitted have remained mysterious, public fear surrounding
AIDS victims has produced a legal crisis as well as a health crisis.6
One of the manifestations of these fears is employment discrimination against persons with AIDS, persons perceived as having AIDS,
and persons who are members of publicly identified "risk groups"-gay
males, intravenous drug abusers, Haitians, and hemophiliacs.6 Pro bono
legal assistance groups have been formed in the three urban centers
with the largest number of AIDS cases-New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.7 Their experience has included a number of

GMHC publishes newsletters written by scientific professionals reporting and explaining the latest
information about AIDS. GMHC publications are a major source of information for anybody
researching the current status of the AIDS epidemic.
4. According to the CDC, as of September 24, 1984, 45% of the confirmed cases of AIDS
had resulted in death. N.Y. Native, Nov. 5, 1984, at 16. As of February I1,1985, the CDC
reported a mortality rate of approximately 48%. Sullivan, Blood Center Fears Impact of AIDS
Test, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1985, at BI, col. 5.
5. The legal crisis surrounding AIDS involves many areas of the law. A legal guide published by Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., to assist attorneys in working with
people who have AIDS, covers such diverse issues as legal rights to services (hospital care, ambulance transport, and funeral arrangements), confidentiality of medical records, medical powers of
attorney, estate planning and administration, housing rights, public benefits (especially disability
benefits), insurance law, immigration law (an issue of particular concern with respect to illegal
aliens suffering from AIDS), and employment discrimination. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (Lambda), is a nonprofit public interest law firm founded in 1973 which litigates
test cases in the area of gay and lesbian rights and promotes public education on the legal aspects
of the rights of gay people through programs and publications. LAMBDA, AIDS LEGAL GUIDE
(1984). See also A. FETTNER & W. CHECK, supra note I, at 223. For vivid illustrations of the
fears surrounding AIDS, see infra notes 65-66. For a good overview of legal issues stemming from
AIDS, see Flaherty, A Legal Emergency Brewing over AIDS, 6 Nat'l. L.J., July 9, 1984, at I, col.
3; see also Comment, supra note I.
6. Figures from CDC, dated July 16, 1984, showed the following breakdown of reported
cases of AIDS: homosexual or bisexual-71.8%; drug abusers-17.5%; hemophiliacs--0.7%; all
others (including persons born in Haiti)-I0%. GMHC-4, supra note 3, at 2. A CDC analysis of
cases, reported as of September 24, 1984, divided the cases by patient characteristics as follows:
gay and bisexual males-73%; drug abusers-I 7%; hemophiliacs-I%; Haitians-4%; individuals
who apparently contracted AIDS through blood transfusions-l%; others-4%. N.Y. Native, Oct
8, 1984, at 18. When an individual showed characteristics of more than one category, CDC would
assign the individual to the category with the largest number of cases. Comment, supra note I, at
721 n.56. The result may be to overemphasize the proportion of AIDS cases which may be attributable to homosexual sexual contact and underemphasize the number attributable to intravenous
drug use, and may, as some argue, result in the creation of a spurious category of "Haitians." The
September 24, 1984, percentage breakdown remained substantially the same in the figures released on April 8, 1985, by the CDC, except CDC had by then eliminated the category of Haitians. N.Y. Native, Apr. 22, 1985, at 13.
7. CDC figures list New York City (3,285 cases), San Francisco (1,107 cases), and Los
Angeles (794 cases) as the cities with the largest number of AIDS cases as of April 8, 1985. The
next largest, with 336 AIDS cases, was Miami. N.Y. Native, Apr. 22, 1985, at 13. Pro bono
panels have also been organized in Washington, D.C., and Detroit.
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cases in which employers, either upon their own motion or at the behest
of coworkers, have taken adverse action, including termination of employment, against such persons. 8 The question whether legal protection
against such discrimination exists has not been litigated to an appellate
level in any jurisdiction, and a variety of legal forums have been explored in attempts to resolve these cases. For example, some administrative agencies in New York which enforce statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of physical disability or handicap have made
initial determinations that persons with AIDS may be protected under
the New York statutes and administrative regulations. Rapid administrative investigation of such charges has resulted in satisfactory settlements of some cases.9 Experience has shown that when employers are
provided with the facts about AIDS and are convinced that discrimination against persons with AIDS may be unlawful, they are usually willing to negotiate a settlement that respects the rights of the person with
AIDS.' 0
The purpose of this article is two-fold: first, to present clearly the
facts about AIDS as they relate to employment rights, and, second, to
demonstrate the degree to which laws forbidding employment discrimination on the basis of physical disability or handicap provide protection
for persons with AIDS.

8. The New York City Commission on Human Rights issued a report on August 27, 1984,
describing a rise in discrimination claims involving antigay bias. The commission attributed part
of the rise in bias to the AIDS epidemic. Report of N.Y.C. Comm'n on Human Rights, UPDATE: The Gay and Lesbian Discrimination Documentation Project: November 1983 through
June 1984, Aug. 27, 1984. The Pro Bono Panel of the Bar Association for Human Rights of
Greater New York, which provides free legal services to persons with AIDS referred through
GMHC and Lambda, has reported numerous cases of employment discrimination against gays
and others who have contracted AIDS,
9. The author has dealt directly with the New York City Human Rights Commission and
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs in a case of AIDS-based discrimination.
Both agencies concluded that they had jurisdiction to investigate the case. The New York State
Division of Human Rights and the counterpart state agency in New Jersey have also informed
lawyers on the Pro Bono Panel of the Bar Association for Human Rights that they believe their
agencies have jurisdiction to pursue discrimination claims filed by people with AIDS, and similar
changes are pending before state agencies in Florida and Michigan. In a case involving discrimination in "public accommodations" on account of AIDS, the New York State Attorney General,
determining that AIDS was a covered "handicap" under the New York Human Rights law,
brought suit for damages and injunctive relief against a cooperative apartment board of directors
which refused to renew the lease of a gay doctor who had treated many AIDS patients on the
premises. Although the case was settled favorably for the plaintiff before going to trial or generating a final decision by the court, the trial judge, in an unpublished opinion, overruled a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under the statute, implicitly affirming the attorney general's
conclusion that AIDS was covered by the state law. The case was eventually settled with the
doctor receiving damages, attorney fees, and a new lease. People v. 49 West 12 Tenants Corp.,
No. 43604/83 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County Oct. 17, 1983).
10. Telephone interview with Mathew J. Shebar, legal services director, Gay Men's Health
Crisis, Inc. (Apr. 24, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Shebar interview].
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BRIEF DESCRIPTION

The body fights off infection by a series of complicated processes
which are collectively called the immune system. The internal processes
of the immune system include three stages: first, the identification of
foreign agents that have entered the body; second, the formation of
antibodies capable of rendering the foreign agents harmless; and, third,
the regulation of production of these antibodies when the foreign agents
are detected. 1
Current theories about AIDS center on the process of regulation
of the production of antibodies. Many scientists now believe that a viral
agent,' 2 perhaps in combination with, or in the presence of one or more
as yet unidentified "cofactors," attacks and destroys certain cells
(called T-helper lymphocytes) whose normal function is to signal for
the production of certain antibodies.13 As a result, the organs of the
immune system which produce these antibodies are not activated, and
the foreign agents proceed unhindered to damage the body in a variety
of ways.
As defined by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the full
AIDS syndrome occurs when the number of T-helper lymphocytes are
so reduced that certain "opportunistic infections" associated with the
syndrome occur. Among these infections are Kaposi's sarcoma, a rare
skin cancer, and pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, an uncommon lung
ailment." While many persons with AIDS who have developed these
"opportunistic infections" require extensive hospitalization, some (especially those who have Kaposi's sarcoma or less serious infections and
are receiving and responding to therapy) are treated on an outpatient
II. A. FETTNER & W. CHECK, supra note 1, at 42-58; Good, Immunologic Aberrations:
The AIDS Defect, in THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 41 (K. Cahill ed. 1983).
12. An American research team, led by Dr. Robert C. Gallo, at the National Institutes of
Health identified human T-cell lymphotrophic virus (variant Ill), abbreviated as HTLV-ll, as
the suspected AIDS virus in the spring of 1984. A French research team, headed by Dr. Luc
Montagnier, had earlier identified another virus (LAV) as a suspected cause of AIDS. Dr. Gallo
contends that the two viruses are variants of the samevirus. Comment, supra note 1, at 724 n.87;
D'Eramo, Discovering the Cause of AIDS: An Interview with Dr. Robert C. Gallo, N.Y. Native,
Aug. 27, 1984, at 16-19. Dr. Montagnier has recently asserted that the two viruses are virtually
identical. Beldekas, Face to Face: The Media and AIDS, N.Y. Native, Feb 25, 1985, at 17.
13. For a more technical explanation of the physiology of AIDS, see Comment, supra note
1, at 722-23. On August 3, 1984, the CDC reported that its researchers had succeeded in causing
a version of AIDS in research primates using the HTLV-1I1 virus, thus providing evidence that
the virus is a probable cause of the disease in humans. GMHC-4, supra note 3, at 6.
14. Foege, supra note 1; Good, supra note 9. For a more detailed treatment of the various
opportunistic infections associated with the syndrome, see Armstrong, Viral Infections; Louria,
Bacterial and Mycotic Infections; Cahill, Parasitic Infections; Safai, Kaposi's Sarcoma, all in
THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (K. Cahill ed. 1983). The CDC surveillance definition for AIDS can be
found in L. MASS, MEDICAL ANSWERS ABOUT AIDS 3-4 (GMHC 1984), and in LAMBDA, supra
note 5, at C-I.
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basis and are physically capable of working.
Preliminary studies indicate that large numbers of individuals in
the "risk group" populations"8 may have been exposed to the viral
agents associated with AIDS but have not developed any symptoms of
the syndrome.' A subgroup of those exposed, consisting of perhaps ten
times the number of those who have CDC-defined AIDS, have developed some physical symptoms which have been interpreted as warning
signs of the possible onset of the syndrome.' 7 These symptoms include
lymphadenopathy (swollen lymph nodes), weight loss, abnormal fatigue, night sweats, and a clinically observable decrease in the production of T-helper lymphocytes in their blood.'" Some individuals with
these "warning" symptoms will go on to develop CDC-defined
AIDS--others will not. Although the severity of the "warning" symptoms and their impact on the physical capabilities of those individuals
experiencing them varies with each individual, many exhibiting these
symptoms are physically capable of working.
It is hypothesized that the viral agent is transmitted through blood
contact as a result of sexual intercourse, blood transfusions, or shared
use of needles by drug users. 19 It is also hypothesized that other body
fluids, such as sweat and saliva, may act as transmission agents,2" but
the strongest case is made for blood transmission. Public health officials
have asserted that current theories about the AIDS syndrome and its
epidemiology would not be consistent with transmission by casual contact of the sort that occurs in a typical workplace (i.e., that AIDS is
not spread by mere touching or airborne transmission of the virus). 2 '
The tentative identification of a particular virus as a cause of
AIDS has led to intensive research in two directions: first, researchers
have sought to develop tests which will detect the virus or evidence of
its presence (past or present) in the blood and, second, researchers seek
to create a vaccine that can trigger production of antibodies for the
virus which would render it harmless before it can attack the body's T-

15. See supra text accompanying note 6.
16. GMHC-4, supra note 3. See also D'Eramo, AIDS Crisis Worse Than Ever, N.Y. Native, Oct 8, 1984, at 12, quoting Dr. James Curran of CDC: "It is clear that a majority of people
will not develop AIDS within the first few years after exposure to the virus."
17. GMHC-4, supra note 3.
18. K. MAYER & H. PIZER, THE AIDS FACT BOOK 25-34 (1983); Beldekas, supra note 10,
at 17, reporting the remarks of Dr. Montagnier at an AIDS symposium in New York City on
February 8, 1985.
19. K. MAYER & H. PIZER, supra note 18, at 36-40; Foege, supra note 1, at 14-16.
20. Altman, AIDS Studies Hint Saliva May Transmit Infection, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1984,
at CI, col. I; D'Eramo, supra note 12.
21. L. Mass, supra note 14; Fain, Study Doubts Casual Spread of AIDS, The Advocate,
Apr. 30, 1985, at 22; Comment, supra note 1, at 724-25.
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helper lymphocytes. 22 CDC licensed several tests for screening blood
donations in March of 1985, amid controversy about their accuracy
and the interpretation of their results.2 If these tests prove effective,
transmission through blood transfusions (a very small percentage of the
known cases of AIDS) 24 can be eliminated by screening donated blood
to detect the virus. If a vaccine is discovered (a development which
may not occur soon), those who have not yet been exposed to the virus
25
can be protected against future infection through its administration.
However, if present estimates of the proportion of the population already exposed to the virus are correct, neither a blood test nor a vaccine would have an immediate, substantial impact on the number of
new cases of AIDS in the absence of some effective method of prevent26
ing full development of the syndrome in those already infected. In
fact, the nature of AIDS indicates that an effective treatment for those
who have developed the syndrome will require a major breakthrough in
medical research-a .method of stimulating the manufacture of new Thelper lymphocytes or a method of artificially simulating the function
of these lymphocytes. 27 Consequently, the heavily publicized announcement of identification of a virus associated with AIDS does not ensure
that the problems of discrimination against persons with AIDS will disappear quickly, because there will probably be many thousands of additional cases.28

22. Cc oper, The High-Stakes Race Is on to Develop Blood Test for AIDS Virus, 16 NAT'L
J., Aug. 4, 1984, at 1470-72; Fain, Ambivalent Support for AIDS Vaccine, The Advocate, Apr.
30, 1985, at 22; Comment, supra note 1,at 724 n.87.
23. Fain, Opposition to Antibody Test Grows, The Advocate, Apr. 16, 1985, at 22.
24. See supra note 6.
25. In remarks delivered at a February 8, 1985, symposium in New York City, Dr. Luc
Montagnier opined that an effective vaccine would be impossible'to develop, due to wide genetic
variations observed in different strains of the suspected virus. Beldekas, supra note 12. Dr.
Montagnier's pessimistic view was echoed at an international conference of AIDS researchers in
Atlanta, Georgia, during April of 1985. Scott, Prevention Seen as Only Hope for AIDS, Wash.
Blade, Apr. 19, 1985, at I.
26. Dr. James Curran, director of the AIDS program at CDC, has stated that as many as
200,000 people may have already been exposed to the suspected virus and that AIDS would probably be the major cause of death for gay men through the end of the century. In a newspaper
interview dated September 24, 1984, Dr. Curran stated: "In spite of the good intentions and
continuing efforts of the gay community and the scientific sector, we should not expect scientific
technology to rescue us from AIDS in the next few years, although eventually technology may
help conquer the disease." D'Eramo, supra note 16.
27. All sources consulted in the preparation of this article agree that at present there is no
known treatment that restores the immune system function, although various experimental treatments are now being tested. E.g., Comment, supra note 1,at 725-26; Fain, Health, The Advocate, Nov. 13, 1984, at 16-17.
28. At a conference of AIDS researchers held in Atlanta in April, 1985, it was asserted that
the number of total cases (then 10,000) could double over the next year. Scott, supra note 25.
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II1.

AIDS

IN THE WORKPLACE

Persons infected with the so-called "AIDS virus" do not present a
uniform profile in terms of their physical condition and suitability for
employment. Current descriptions of the disease and its course indicate
that there are four categories of such individuals, each of which may
present different issues in the workplace:
(I) Those who have been exposed to the virus but who display no
physical symptoms (a category whose known members may increase
dramatically as the blood tests licensed by CDC come into general
use);
(II) Those who display symptoms characterized as "warning"
symptoms that AIDS may develop;
(III) Those who have contracted an opportunistic infection indicating development of the syndrome but who do not require hospitalization and are physically able to work;
(IV) Those who have contracted multiple infections or require extended hospitalization, or who have been so weakened by such infections and the syndrome that they are relatively immobile.2 9
Discrimination in the workplace is primarily experienced by members of the first three categories. It is unlikely that an individual in
category IV would be capable of performing continued work. Those in
the second and third categories are the individuals who are presently
encountering the most serious discrimination problems. In addition,
those in the first category, once identified, may well encounter discrimination similar to those in categories II and III. Indeed, some of the
cases handled by the pro bono legal panels involved persons who may
have been in category I (or who may not even have been exposed to the
virus), and have suffered employment discrimination because they were
perceived as presenting a problem as members of a "risk group" who
had sought medical assistance or were known associates of individuals
with AIDS.30
The key aspects of AIDS relevant to the concerns of employers,
fellow employees, and business customers center on infectiousness and
physical ability. While questions about infectiousness may not yet be
answered definitively, it appears that under normal workplace conditions infectiousness is not a real problem. 1 During the early history of
29. Shebar interview, supra note 10.
30. In one particularly egregious case handled by the New York Pro Bono Panel, an individual was discharged when it was learned that he had gone to the hospital to visit a friend who
had AIDS. Another case involved a gay employee who was fired because his employer assumed
that his request to take time off to see a doctor meant that he had AIDS. Comment, supra note 1,
at 735.
31. GMHC-4, supra note 3. Based on expert testimony, a New York trial judge held in a
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the AIDS epidemic, it was sometimes suggested that persons infected
with AIDS should not be employed in food preparation or serving, or in
other occupations where a personal service may require physical contact with customers. While such suggestions might have had some surface plausibility when virtually nothing was known about how AIDS
might be transmitted, current views about the epidemiology of AIDS
suggest that they reflect undue panic, as there is apparently no solid
evidence of anyone contracting AIDS through food or external physical
32

contact.

The issues surrounding physical ability are complicated by the unpredictable progress of the disease. Someone infected with the virus
may appear perfectly health and suddenly develop skin lesions characteristic of Kaposi's sarcoma. Others may exhibit many of the debilitating "warning" symptoms, such as fatigue and weight loss, which impact upon the physical ability to perform work, without developing an
opportunistic infection. It seems clear, however, that some proportion
of those in categories I, II, and III are fully capable of working, and,
both psychologically and financially, need to keep working as long as
they are physically able to do so. The AIDS literature does not suggest
that the physical exertion of working necessarily provokes a worsening
of the disease. Although it might seem that a person with a compromised immune system would be more likely to contract infections if he
or she came into contact with large numbers of people, such would not

case involving a prison work setting that AIDS was not spread by casual contact in the workplace.
LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. Duchess County 1983). An
arbitrator, ruling under a collective bargaining agreement in the case of an AIDS-diagnosed airline flight attendant, came to the same conclusion. Guilfoy, United Employee Reinstated, Gay
Community News (Boston), Feb. 16, 1985, at 3; Newsbrief, The Advocate, Mar. 5, 1985, at 20.
32. The New York State Health Department, AIDS Institute, has published posters for
workplace use which state: "There is no evidence that a person can get AIDS from handshakes,
dishes, toilet seats, door knobs, or from daily contact with a person who has AIDS." As epidemiological studies of reported cases advance, the percentage of cases which cannot be assigned to one
of the suspected models of transmission has dwindled to 4%. See supra note 6.
This article is primarily concerned with the statutory bases for combating employment discrimination against persons with AIDS. However, where discrimination occurs in a unionized
workplace governed by a collective bargaining agreement, resort to labor arbitration may provide
the speediest and most effective form of relief.
An airline flight attendant diagnosed with AIDS was placed on medical leave by United
Airlines in 1983 without being given a physical examination to determine his physical ability to
perform his job. An impartial arbitrator appointed under the collective bargaining agreement
heard expert medical testimony about AIDS and ruled that the airline could not implement a
policy of automatically laying off employees diagnosed with AIDS. Rather, a physical examination would be required to determine the flight attendant's fitness to work. The arbitrator rejected
the argument that an employee with AIDS would automatically pose a health threat to fellow
employees or passengers. Traynor v. United Airlines, (Jan. 7, 1985) (unreported arbitration decision). See Guilfoy, supra note 31; Newsbrief, supra note 31; Telephone interview with Martin
Wagner, arbitrator (Feb. 20, 1985).
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necessarily be the case if the physiological conditions that lead to opportunistic infections when the immune system is compromised are either so ubiquitous that only total isolation from human contact would
prevent infection or if the person with AIDS (or indeed, a large proportion of the pertinent "risk group" populations) has these triggering conditions in his or her system anyway, awaiting the opportunity to develop in the absence of immune function. The opportunistic infections
associated with AIDS have previously been observed in persons whose
immune systems were compromised by immuno-suppressive medical
treatment or other illnesses, suggesting that they are not something
"caught" from the surrounding environment, but rather something
generated from physiological conditions normally found in the body, but
harmless in the presence of an adequately functioning immune system.
Consequently, in the absence of better evidence that workplace exertion
and exposure present a serious risk either to the person with AIDS or
coworkers and customers, persons with AIDS who are physically able
to work should be treated in the same way as others with physical disabilities who are, despite those disabilities, physically capable of performing a job.

IV.

HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION LAWS-APPLICABILITY TO

AIDS

American law presumes that the employment relationship in the
private sector is "at will" unless the employer's discretion to terminate
the relationship has been abridged by contract, statute, or, in some jurisdictions, public policy. Due to constitutional due process guarantees
restricting the government when it is acting as an employer, and to
federal and state civil service laws and regulations restricting discharge
to some approximation of "just cause" similar to that found in private
sector collective bargaining agreements, public sector employees have
somewhat more job security. 33 Federal and state legislation against employment discrimination in both sectors provides a major exception to
the "at will" principle, and prohibitions of discrimination on the basis
of physical disability or handicap have become a prominent feature of
such laws in recent years. 34
There is no nationwide, comprehensive, regulatory scheme governing disability discrimination. The federal government, in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibits discrimination in its own employment
practices, and the practices of its large contractors and programs re33. See generally P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); Summers,
Individual Protection against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976).
34. Comment, Employment Discrimination-Analyzing Handicap Discrimination Claims:
The Right Tools for the Job, 62 N.C.L. REV. 535 (1984). Federal and state statutes almost
uniformly use the term "handicap," although the individuals involved prefer the term "disability."
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ceiving federal financial assistance.3 5 Forty-two states and the District
of Columbia have adopted legislation forbidding such discrimination in

private (and in most jurisdictions public) sector employment, with an
additional five states prohibiting such discrimination only in the public
sector. Three states have no legislation on the subject."'
Because of the widely varying language defining covered persons
(as well as widely varying interpretations of such language by state
courts), and the lack of case law discussing conditions (such as AIDS)
due to illness or communicable diseases, the general applicability of all
of these laws to persons with AIDS cannot simply be assumed. In two
states the statutes expressly exclude coverage for persons suffering from
"6communicable diseases,"'37 and one state expressly excludes coverage
for disability by virtue of illness; 8 one might conclude in the absence of
case law that coverage for AIDS may not easily be obtained in those
three jurisdictions.

35. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, is the source of federal prohibitions of
employment discrimination against handicapped persons. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96(i) (1982). Section
793 requires most federal contractors to undertake affirmative action to employ handicapped individuals in performing their contracts. Id. § 793. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act forbids
employment discrimination against handicapped persons by programs receiving federal financial
assistance. Id. § 794. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1298 (1984), the Supreme
Court held that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applied to all federal financial assistance,
not just to that specifically aimed at creating jobs in the programs assisted. In a contemporaneous,
consistent decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that receipt of Medicare and Medicaid funds by hospitals made them subject to the nondiscrimination policies of § 504. United
States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Center, 736 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
958 (1985). Subsequently, airlines using airports that were constructed and operated with federal
financial assistance have been held subject to the act. Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 752 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
imposes the same nondiscrimination policies on "departments, agencies, and instrumentalities" of
the federal executive branch, including the postal service. See Prewitt v. United States Postal
Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
36. State laws pertaining to employment discrimination are conveniently collected in LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA), FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL, vol. 8A, and EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH), vol. 3.
Jurisdictions which apparently do not have laws forbidding discrimination against handicapped
persons are Arizona, Delaware, Wyoming, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands. Jurisdictions protecting only public employees are Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Mississippi, and South Dakota. Legislation pending in Virginia and Wyoming as of April, 1985, may change the compositions of these
lists and other categories based on statute terminology.
37. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6a-3(b) (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.140(2)(c) (Baldwin
1981).
38. New Hampshire defines "handicap" as a handicap, other than illness, unrelated to a
person's ability to perform a particular job." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3 (xiii) (1984).
However the administrative rules promulgated under the statute, H.U.M.§ 405.1, define "illness"
as a "short term, temporary medical condition." This definition arguably would not inZlude AIDS,
because it is more correctly classified under the administrative definition of "handicap" as "a
permanent, long term, or chronic physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more major life activities." If the New Hampshire courts look to the administrative definition as
authoritative, AIDS may be covered despite the statutory exclusion of coverage for illness.
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Although the definitional language varies widely among the states,
certain patterns of terminology emerge. The most common terminology
is contained in the federal law and repeated, with minor variations, in
pertinent laws or regulations in thirteen jurisdictions, defining a "handicapped" person as one who "has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities." 9 The Rehabilitation Act, and ten of the thirteen jurisdictions,
also expressly extend coverage to those not presently disabled but who
have "a record of such impairment" or are "regarded as having such
an impairment.14 0 Some jurisdictions go on to define "major life activities" in terms of physical actions typical of a normal, healthy existence,
emphasizing use of the senses, locomotion, and rational thought, but
these "list" definitions (which do not mention "immune function" as a
major life activity) are, from their context, clearly not meant to be exhaustive or exclusive.4 Some of the laws further define "impairment"
in terms of various organs and body systems, and such definitions usually include reference to the hemic (blood) and lymphatic systems, i.e.,
the central organs of the immune function.42 Persons with AIDS would
appear to be within the "impairment" category because the ability to
fight infection and preserve health is logically a "major life function,"
albeit less visible than walking, talking, or lifting. AIDS is certainly an
"impairment" of that function, especially when the statutory "clinical"
definition of "impairment" includes those organs central to the immune
function. More significantly, individuals suffering from either discrimination because of medical treatment or from a general perception of
them as "AIDS risks" would be covered in those jurisdictions which
extend the definition to include individuals with a record of disability or
who are regarded as having a disability. 43

39. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301 (1982) (does not include
mental handicaps); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-22(3) (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2253(1)
(West 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § I (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
363.01(25) (West Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(K) (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§ 1301(4) (West Supp. 1984-1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.400(2) (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-56(H) (Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-2(14) (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
495d(5) (Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE § 5-1 1-3(t) (Supp. 1984); 16 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 44.4.
40. Of those jurisdictions listed in supra note 39, Georgia, Utah, and West Virginia do not
mention protection for those with a record of disability or those regarded as disabled, and Georgia
specifically excludes coverage for individuals with communicable diseases. See supra note 37 and
accompanying text. Some other states which do not use the federal definition of handicap do
incorporate these concepts of extended coverage into their statutes or regulations. See, e.g., Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 111.34.(1) (West Supp. 1984).
41. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(L) (1978).
42. See. e.g. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(H)(i) (Supp. 1984).
43. In this regard, it is significant that some state courts have found that protection extends
to people with a record of a disability, or who are regarded as having a disability, even though
their state statutes do not expressly provide for such coverage, on the theory that such individuals
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Six jurisdictions have enacted some variation of a basic definition
which covers "anatomical, physiological or neurological disability, infirmity, malformation, or disfigurement which is caused by injury, birth
defect, or illness."" Coverage of persons with AIDS under this definition seems likely as the syndrome of suppressed immune function is
clearly a physiological disability or infirmity caused by an illness. Three
jurisdictions have definitions which are similar, albeit truncated, specifying a physical handicap, infirmity or impairment which may result,
inter alia, from illness."5 Four jurisdictions merely require a "condition" which constitutes a substantial disability, 46 while other individual
jurisdictions with their own peculiarly worded definitions introduce further variants of the above definitions. 47 Some 'state laws prohibiting
handicap discrimination provide no definition of "handicap. 4 8 Several

are suffering discrimination because of prejudice against the disabled-the prohibited motivation
under the statute. See Comment, supra note 34, at 541-48. For a discussion of the logical bases
for extending coverage to perceived disabilities, see Note, Cancer as a Protected Handicap in
Illinois, 60 CHI. [-] KENT L. REV. 715 (1984).
44. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300 (1984); See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553 (1977);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49(b), § 15(g) (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(16) (1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 48-1102(8) (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
45. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-51(15) (West Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 12502(23) (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 68, § 1-103(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985).
46. IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(q) (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.2(11) (West 1975); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-1002(j) (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 296.010(4) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
47. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12926(h) (West 1980) ("physical handicap" includes "impairment
. . .of physical ability because of . . .loss of function or coordination, or any other health impairment which requires special education or related services."); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 378-1
(Supp. 1983) ("physical handicap" means "a substantial physical impairment where such handicap is verified by medical finding and appears reasonably certain to continue throughout the lifetime of the individual without substantial improvement."); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
37.1103(b)(i) (West Supp. 1984) ("handicap" means "a determinable physical ... characteristic
of an individual . . . which may result from disease . . . which . . . is unrelated to the individ-

ual's ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position, or is unrelated to the individual's
qualifications for employment or promotion."); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 292(21) (McKinney 1982 &
Supp. 1984) ("handicap" means "physical ... impairment resulting from . . . physiological...
conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrated by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnosis techniques.. ");OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4112.01(13) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984) ("handicap" means "A medically diagnosable, abnormal
condition which is expected to continue for a considerable length of time . . . which can reasonably be expected to limit the person's functional ability . . . or any limitation due to weakness and
significantly decreased endurance .. ");S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-7-35 (Law. Co-op. 1983) (essentially similar to Hawaii statute); TEx. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 121.002(4)- (Vernon 1980)
(" 'handicapped person' means a person who has a . . .physical handicap, including . . .hardness of hearing, deafness, speech impairment, visual handicap, being crippled, or any other health
impairment which requires special ambulatory devices or services."); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
11.32(8)(a) (West Supp. 1984) (a person has a physical handicap if he "has a physical . . .
impairment which makes achievement unusually difficult or limits the capacity to work ....");
WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. § 166-22-040 ("a person will be considered to be handicapped ...

if he

or she is discriminated against because of the condition and the condition is abnormal.").
48. Those states with no statutory definition of "handicap" or "disability" include: Florida,
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states require that the disability have a long-term or permanent aspect,
as opposed to a transient condition caused by a short-term illness; other
states require that the disabling condition be "medically
diagnosable." '49 Perhaps the simplest, most wide-ranging definition is
found in the state of Washington's Administrative Code: ". . for enforcement purposes, a person will be considered handicapped . . . if he
or she is discriminated against because of the condition and the condition is abnormal." 5 0 These laws are very new and there is little case law
explicating the definitions of coverage. 51 Most case law supports the
assertion that a condition such as AIDS is a "disability" or "handicap"
of the type covered by these laws, although none of the cases discuss a
condition exactly like AIDS.5 2
Virtually all of the jurisdictions provide that discrimination
against the disabled is lawful if the physical requirements of the job
cannot be performed by the individual; however, the phrasing of these

Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
49. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 378-1 (Supp. 1983): MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1103(b)(i)
(West Supp. 1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(13) (Page 1980); S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-735(l) (Law. Co-op 1983). See also New Hampshire definition of "illness," supra note 38.
50. WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 166-22-040.
51. A review of the BNA and CCH employment practice reporters revealed judicial consideration of the scope of coverage for disabilities in fewer than half the jurisdictions which have
statutes. See E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii 1980); Welsh v. Municipality of Anchorage, 676 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1984); American National Ins. Co. v. Fair Empl. &
Hous. Comm'n, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 818 (Cal. 1982); Summers v. Iowa C.R.C., 33
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 34,260 (Iowa 1983); Kubik v. CNA Fin. Corp., 96 Ill. App. 3d 715,
422 N.E.2d I (1981); Advocates for the Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d
512, 385 N.E.2d 39 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979); High v. Power Flame Div., 29
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
32,866 (Kan. Dist. Ct. 1982); Lewis v. Remmele Eng'g, Inc., 314
N.W.2d I (Minn. 1981); Anderson v. Exxon Co., 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 33,428 (N.J.
1982); Rogers v. Campbell Foundry Co., 185 N.J. Super. 109 (1982); State Div. of Human
Rights v. Xerox Corp., 102 A.D.2d 543, 478 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1984); Pacific Motor Trucking Co. v.
Bureau of Labor, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,271 (Or. Ct. App. 1983), affid, 33 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH)
32,249 (5th Cir. 1984); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bureau of Labor, 280 Or.
163, 570 P.2d 76 (1977); Amtrak v. Pennsylvania, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
33,420 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1983); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 448 A.2d 701 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1982): Providence Journal Co. v. Mason 116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976); Salt Lake City Corp.
v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983); Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 22 Wash. App.
576, 591 P.2d 461 (1979); Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. v. Washington State Human Rights
Comm'n., 87 Wash. 2d 802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976); Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Wisconsin, 90 Wis. 2d
408, 280 N.W.2d 142 (1979); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor, &
Human Relations, 86 Wis. 2d 393, 273 N.W.2d 206 (1979). See also Wardlow v. Great Lakes
Express Co., 128 Mich. App. 54, 339 N.W.2d 670 (1983), discussed in Ettinger, Accommodating
the Handicapped Employee: When Is the Burden Undue?, 63 MICH. BAR J. 831, 832 (1984)
(discussing recent cases). As noted above, there is no case law on AIDS in the context of employment, but a New York judge held AIDS to be a covered "handicap" under New York's law in
People v. 49 West 12 Tenants Corp., No. 43604/83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Oct. 17, 1983).
52. See, e.g., Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Deparatment of Indus. Labor & Human Relations, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 344, 345 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976).
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exceptions varies widely, producing different tests in different jurisdictions. The federal Rehabilitation Act's phrase, "otherwise qualified
handicapped individual,""3 clearly connotes that a person who can perform the requirements of the job, despite his disability, must be treated
equally with others who have no physical disability. Some statutes,
however, speak in terms of the disability having to be "unrelated" to
actual job requirements in order for coverage to apply 5 4-a formulation
which, if literally applied, would remove coverage from a large proportion of otherwise qualified disabled persons. Some state enforcement
agencies and courts have interpreted these laws in their official guidelines or rules to mean that the individual is protected unless his or her
disability substantially affects his or her ability to do the job.55 Such an
agency interpretation was rejected by the Court of Appeals of New
York, prompting a subsequent amendment of the New York Human
Rights law to overrule the court and reinstate the agency's original interpretation.5 In light of the New York experience, one cannot assume
that such "softening" administrative interpretations of restrictive statutory language will be authoritative in jurisdictions where the courts
have not yet passed on their validity.
Many jurisdictions subject handicap discrimination plaintiffs to
the same "bona fide occupational qualification" test applicable to cases
of sex or age discrimination.5 7 This statutory test is frequently accompanied by regulatory interpretations which rule out various "business
justifications" that employers have sometimes asserted, such as coworker or customer preferences or increased costs to the employer. 8
Some jurisdictions extend coverage to disabled individuals who can per-

53. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); see also Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.
397, 406 (1979) (otherwise qualified person is "one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap.").
54. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 49B, § 16 (1979); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 37.1103 (Supp. 1984-1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
296.010 (Vernon Supp. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(XIII) (1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, §§ 954(p), 955 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); South Carolina, Handicapped Bill of Rights, § 6.
55. See, e.g., ILL. COMM. GUIDELINES; Mo. COMM. RULES, 4 C.S.R. 180-3.060; N.H. COMM.
RULES § 405.3-4-5.6; S.C. COMM. RULES, art. 7; VA. CODE § 40.1-28.7 (1981); Amtrak v. Pennsylvania, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 33,420 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 18, 1982).
56. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 49 N.Y.2d 234, 401
N.E.2d 196, 425 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1980); State Div. of Human Rights v. County of Monroe, 48
N.Y.2d 727, 377 N.E.2d 117, 422 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1979) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
57. Those jurisdictions include: Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Washington, and West
Virginia.
58. Those jurisdictions which rule out various business justifications include: District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and West
Virginia.
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form the job with reasonable accommodations by the employer.5 9 Many
of these laws specify that employers need not employ the disabled in
situations where such employment would threaten the health or the
safety of the disabled employee, coworkers, customers, or the general
public. 60
Despite significant variations in language between jurisdictions,
some general observations can be made about potential protection from
employment discrimination for persons with AIDS. The question of discrimination against persons who contract disabling infectious illnesses
seems not to have been directly considered by many state legislatures;
however, those which have considered it have occasionally expressed
opposition to extending protection. 6 1 Most statutes which mention disease or illness do so in an apparent effort to establish that a physical
impairment caused by an illness can be the basis for protection in the
same manner as a defect caused by genetics or injuries. 62 In those
states the language employed is consistent with an interpretation that
impairment due to an ongoing illness is covered-although that interpretation may not be an "exact fit" with the tone of the statute-so
long as other requirements of the statute (that the individual be otherwise qualified, not present a significant safety hazard to others) are
met. All of the statutes share the underlying concept that persons
whose physical abilities are impaired should not be deprived of work
which they are capable of performing, and that each individual job applicant or current employee should be judged on the basis of his or her
present ability to meet the bona fide physical requirements of a job.
59. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402(a) (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2254(C)(1)
(West 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151(B), § 4 (West Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
363.01 Subd. 25a(I) & (2) (West Supp. 1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(0)(1) (Page
1980 & Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.425(a) (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (d)(6)
(Supp. 1984); WIs. STAT. ANN. § I I1.34(i)(b) (West Supp. 1984); 56 Ill. Admin. Reg. §
2500.40(a) (1982).
60. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a)(I) (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§ 4573(4) (1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 296.020 (Vernon Supp. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354A:3(XIII) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(2) (Page Supp. 1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
111.34(2)(b) (West Supp. 1984). Cf High, 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) V 32,866; Lewis, 314
N.W.2d I (Minn. 1981); Bucyrus-Erie Co., 90 Wis. 2d 408, 280 N.W.2d 142, Pacific Motor
Trucking Co., 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
34,271; Amtrak, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) T
33,420; 56 Ill. Admin. Reg. § 2500.40(a) (1982).
61. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-3 (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 207.140 (1981); 31 N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(13) (1984). See supra notes 37-38.
62. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(13) (1984); CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12926(h) (1980)
("health impairment"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-51(15) (West Supp. 1983); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1709(4) (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553 (7)(A) (1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 37.1103(b) (West Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 49-3-101(4) (1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 48.1102(8) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10-5-5(q) (West Supp. 1984); TEx. HuM.
RES. CODE ANN. § 121.003 (Vernon 1982) (health impairment). See also MD. ADMIN. CODE. §
14.03.02 (1982).
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Given this underlying policy, discrimination against persons with AIDS
should be presumed to come within the statutory protection of most
jurisdictions unless the express wording of the statute would contradict
such a presumption. Likewise, a person with CDC-defined AIDS
should fall within the scope of the statutory definitions which require
"impairment of life activities" or "limitations upon physical ability"
because AIDS impairs the "essential life function" of the immune system, limiting the ability of the body to fight infection and preserve
health, and causing physical debilitation that affects strength and
endurance.
Persons who do not have CDC-defined AIDS, and who thus may
not technically be considered "disabled," but who are subject to discrimination because they belong to "risk groups" or have milder symptoms indicative of possible development of the syndrome, should also be
protected in those jurisdictions which accept the concept of protection
for persons "regarded" or "perceived" as being handicapped. 3 Thus, if
an individual is discharged or refused employment because he or she is
a member of an AIDS risk group who has developed lymphadenopathy
(swollen lymph glands), that person should be statutorily protected because the motivation of the employer is the same unlawful motivation
as that expressly condemned by the statute: animus against a class of
individuals which unfairly ignores their individual qualifications and is
based on prejudicial beliefs about the class. Conceptualized in this way,
the case of a person "perceived" to have AIDS provides a strong argument for statutory protection even in those states where the statute
speaks only of protecting the "disabled," because the actions of the employer are motivated by unlawful prejudice.
V.

EMPLOYER DEFENSES

Determining that the antidiscrimination laws apply to persons with
AIDS does not end the inquiry. There are affirmative defenses that
may be raised by employers, some of which may have a strong appeal
to "neutral" decisionmakers. Because CDC-defined AIDS is at present
apparently incurable and frequently fatal, 4 and because the mechanism of transmission is not definitely established, fear of the disease
may be as great a motivating factor as malice or dislike for those af-

63. See supra note 35. The most widely used definition of "handicap," that contained in the
federal Rehabilitation Act, expressly provides protection for those regarded as being handicapped.
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). Several other jurisdictions, as noted above, have incorporated this
concept in their administrative regulations, or guidelines. See Comment, supra note 34, at 541-42.
Some courts, as noted, have adopted the concept as an interpretation of a statute which does not
expressly include it. Id. at 542-48. See Note, supra note 43.
. 64. N.Y. Native, Oct. 8, 1984, at 17; id., Nov. 5, 1984, at 16.
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flicted or perceived as afflicted with the syndrome. This fear may, to
the extent it appears genuine or justified, infect the decision-making
process.6 5
The foremost affirmative defense in an AIDS case is fear of contagion. 66 Unfortunately, in the short time since laws against disability
discrimination have been passed, there has been virtually no case law
involving infectious conditions. 6 As a result, any prediction as to how
decisionmakers will deal with this defense will have to be based more
on logic and analogy than actual precedent. If AIDS presents a significant threat of infection to coworkers or customers of the employer, it
would seem well-established, by virtue of cases focusing on safety issues
in the workplace, that the affirmative defense would prevail. 68 Indeed,
two state antidiscrimination statutes expressly exclude from coverage
individuals with "communicable diseases," apparently without regard
for how the diseases might be transmitted in the workplace." Many
state statutes, or accompanying administrative interpretations, recog-

65. A startling illustration of the fears generated by publicity about AIDS is provided by an
incident in a New York City trial court on October 23, 1984. A man diagnosed as having AIDS
was standing trial for a murder committed prior to his diagnosis. The judge had called upon the
City Health Commissioner to appear personally to assure court personnel and jurors that they
were not endangered by the defendant's presence in the courtroom. The defendant wore a surgical
mask. Despite the health official's statement to those in the courtroom that "AIDS was not transmitted through the air and that they did not have to be concerned about being in the same courtroom with the defendant," half of the prospective jurors asked to be excused, and court officers
insisted on wearing masks and surgical gloves. The judge denied defense counsel's request that the
officers be ordered to remove their protective paraphernalia to avoid prejudicing the jury. The
president of the court officers' union was quoted as fearing for the health of the officers because
"germs are spreading all over the court." Shenon, Court Officers Wear Masks and Gloves at Trial
of a Defendant with AIDS, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1984, at BI, col. 1. See also 3 Emp. Rel.
Weekly (BNA), April 1, 1985, at 387.
66. This defense is illustrated by the case of Todd Shuttleworth, a 31-year old Floridian
with AIDS, who was discharged from a public sector clerical job after his employer learned of the
diagnosis. The employer stated in justification of the discharge: "The doctor could not tell us that
there was absolutely no chance that Todd might transmit the disease to others; we couldn't get
that 100 percent guarantee. We just couldn't take the chance of anything happening to fellow
employees or anyone else visiting the office. Anyone who has AIDS usually dies-it's not just the
case of infecting someone with a disease that is curable." Shuttleworth, who was physically able to
work despite his AIDS infection, countered that several of his coworkers were permitted to smoke
in the office even though doctors could not assure that exposure to smoke would not cause lung
cancer, suggesting a double standard existed. The Weekly News (Miami, Fla.), Sept. 26, 1984, at
3; 3 Emp. Rel. Weekly (BNA), supra note 65. Similar justifications have been offered by employers in New York City cases handled by the New York Pro Bono Panel. Shebar interview, supra
note 10.
67. A review of published decisions in BNA and CCH reporters revealed no cases in which
infection or contagion was an issue
68. See, e.g., Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Wisconsin, 90 Wis. 2d 408, 419-22, 280 N.W.2d 142,
147-49 (1979); Amtrak, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 33,420.
69. See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-3 (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.140 (Baldwin
1981).
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nize the safety of the individual employee, coworkers, customers, and
the public at large as a legitimate concern. 70 However, medical facts
concerning AIDS indicate that the infection issue may turn on questions not yet answerable-in particular the question of when an individual is contagious. If, by the time opportunistic infections appear, the
virus has run its course and destroyed the body's T-helper lymphocytes,
then it is possible that category III individuals are not sources of contagion, even though they may exhibit physical symptoms (such as skin
lesions) that frighten others.71 If the AIDS virus is transmissible during
its incubation period, when there are no apparent physical symptoms,
then category I individuals would appear most vulnerable to the contagion defense, although the epidemiology of the disease suggests that
such individuals will not present any danger to others by virtue of casual contact in the workplace.
The most difficult case concerns category II individuals, who are
presently experiencing significant discrimination. Unfortunately, it is
not known whether persons exhibiting the "warning" symptoms are infectious. However, the question of whether an individual is infectious
should not be as important with respect to job discrimination as the
question of how an individual is infectious. If the disease is only transmissible through types of physical contact which would not occur in the
performance of the job, then discrimination against the individual
based on fear of infection is logically unjustified even when the individual is technically "infectious" for the disease. Thus far, public health
authorities have taken the view that AIDS is not transmissible through
the sort of casual, nonintimate contact characteristic of most work
situations.
Another affirmative defense which might be raised is expense to
the employer occasioned by health coverage costs and employee absenteeism. If an employee in category I progresses to category II, it is

70. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
71. Studies to detect the presence of HTLV-lii in saliva were reported in October 1984, to
have revealed none of the virus present in individuals who had CDC-defined AIDS. However, the
virus was present in the saliva of eight of 18 of the individuals who had so-called "pre-AIDS"
symptoms or close contact with individuals who had AIDS. With regard to these studies, National
Institutes of Health researcher Dr. Robert C. Gallo stated: "There is not yet clear-cut epidemiological evidence that the virus is transmitted by saliva to cause AIDS, yet this now has to be
considered. The question remains open whether saliva is a significant means of transmission. It is
there and has to be studied but I don't think saliva is a major route of transmission of AIDS in
humans." N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1984, at CI, C5, col. I.
72. See supra note 21. In the only reported judicial opinion which considered transmission
of AIDS, a trial judge in New York was convinced by expert testimony that AIDS was not transmitted by casual contact. LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 703, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 307
(Sup. Ct. 1983). A labor arbitrator, considering expert medical testimony in an employee discharge case, reached the same conclusion. Guilfoy, supra note 31.
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likely that the employee's attendance record at work will suffer. Category III employees will almost certainly have to miss periods of work
due to required treatment or occasional episodes of serious infection
requiring bedrest or hospitalization. Furthermore, if an employee
claims coverage under an employee health benefit plan for the extensive
treatments required for opportunistic infections, the employer's insurance premium rates may be raised to reflect the increased claims under
the employer's policy. However, statutes, regulations, and case law
have usually rejected the arguments of employers that employees who
had the potential for incurring such expenses or inconvenience due to
their disability were not protected from discrimination. 73 The antidiscrimination legislation represents a policy decision that employers must
bear some of society's cost in providing work opportunities for the disabled. The decision to extend legal protection against discrimination
must be held to have been made with the realization that some additional costs would be imposed on employers, because it could reasonably be expected that disabled persons may, through no fault of their
own, have occasional attendance problems not experienced by other
employees, or may occasionally make larger claims on employee health
coverage systems than nondisabled employees. The question is one of
reasonableness. If a category II or category III employee's attendance
is so sporadic that he or she could not accurately be characterized as a
regular, full-time employee, and the employer needs to have regular,
full-time coverage on the job, then medical- leave might be justifiable on
attendance grounds. However, by analogy to existing case law refusing
to recognize such a defense with respect to other disabilities, adverse
action based on a prediction that a category I, II, or III employee will
become an unreasonable economic burden on the employer would not
be permissible.
Affirmative defenses to civil rights legislation based upon nonacceptance of members of the protected class by coworkers or customers
have been rejected in race and sex discrimination cases.7 4 However,
these defenses are worth mentioning here because fear generated by

73. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also State Div. of Human Rights v.
Xerox Corp., N.Y.L.J., May 8, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1985); Chrysler Outboard Corp.
v. Department of Indus. Labor & Human Relations, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 344, 345
(Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976).
74. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971) (sex discrimination); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), on remand, 346 F. Supp. 1301 (D. Fla. 1972) (sex
discrimination); Wigginess, Inc. v. Fruchtman, 482 F. Supp. 681, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 628
F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (sex discrimination). Cf. Rucker v. Higher
Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181-82 (7th Cir. 1982) (racial and sex discrimination). See 29
C.F.R. § 160 4.2(a)(l)(iii) (1984) (sex).
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AIDS has created public uncertainty about the safety of employing
persons with AIDS as restaurant workers, hairdressers, or health care
workers. 7 5 Some cases of discrimination have been encountered in
which the motivation of the employer was stated as fear that customers
would stay away, or that coworkers had refused or would refuse to
work in proximity to persons with AIDS. Assuming rejection of the
contagion defense, this separate defense should carry no weight, since
the coworker and customer rejections are based on the same prejudices
and misinformation that would be unlawful if they directly motivated
the employer's decision to discriminate. It may seem unfair to place the
burden on the employer to educate the public, but this burden has been
placed on employers with respect to race and sex discrimination, and it
has been held in both instances that the underlying statutory purpose to
eliminate discrimination in employment cannot give way to the uninformed prejudices of the market place. 76 Several state laws against disability discrimination have been construed by enforcement agencies to
upon rejection or disapproval by coworkers,
forbid discrimination based
77
customers, or the public.
The futility defense may also be raised by employers, who would
contend that it is pointless to invest training in an employee or applicant with AIDS because the disease is fatal and the individual will not
be employable long enough to justify the investment. While it is true
that AIDS (although not necessarily all the opportunistic infections associated with the syndrome) is at present apparently untreatable and
frequently fatal, and that it can be assumed with fair probability that
category IV individuals will probably die from the disease within a few
years of diagnosis, new developments in research and treatment are
now occurring quickly enough to offer hope that category III individuals may not invariably die. 78 Current evidence also suggests that a significant portion of category I and category II individuals may never
develop the full AIDS syndrome.79 Consequently, discrimination
against employees or job applicants based on the futility argument
must be viewed with considerable skepticism in cases involving category I or category II employees, and at least with a demand for mote
individualized scrutiny of the particular case with respect to category
LAMBDA. supra note 5, at 1-4; Flaherty, supra note 5.
See cases cited supra note 74.
These constructions are sometimes contained in express regulations or guidelines pubthe agencies, and sometimes in the text of the law itself. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 12503(a) (1981); ME. COMM. REGS., § 3.08(B); MONT. COMM. RULES, § 24.9.1404; N.J. COMM.

75.
76.
77.
lished by

RULES OF PRACTICE, § 13.11-1.5; OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-08(D)(2)(c)(i) (1980); OR.
COMM. RULES, § 839-06-250; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-22-040; W. VA. COMM. RULES § 4.06.

78.
79.

Scott, supra note 25, at 10.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

1985]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

III employees. An individual who is receiving successful treatment for
skin lesions, and, generally, is otherwise healthy and able to work,
should not be denied employment on the mere possibility that development of a later opportunistic infection may curtail his working ability.
Finally, employers may advance the "altruistic" defense that they
are concerned for the employee's own health, which would be endangered by working. This defense, which is articulated in several state
statutes and regulations,8" requires particularized analysis in each case,
depending upon the requirements of the job and the physical condition
of the employee in question. In the absence of evidence that working is
an aggravating risk factor for individuals in categories I, II, or III, this
defense should not prevail unless it can be shown with reasonable certainty that the particular physical conditions of the job are such as to
aggravate the disease or interfere with its treatment.8 1 Furthermore, a
response to the "altruistic" defense might demand exploration of a reasonable accommodation of the employee's needs that would lessen the
relevance of the defense. For example, a hospital employee might be
reassigned to a different work station in which similar work is performed without constant exposure to infectious patients, if such a position exists. Such accommodations might be difficult in jobs covered by
union agreements which limit employer discretion to shift job assignments.8 2 However, it is possible to argue that the Title VII case law
(under which such union restrictions might limit the employee accommodation obligation) is inapplicable to the non-Title VII realm of disability discrimination, because the federal Rehabilitation Act and some
state civil rights laws covering disabilities do not have the same express
protections for bona fide union seniority systems as Title VII. 83
A review of these defenses and the arguments which may be raised
in response to them illustrates that the question whether a particular
person with AIDS is entitled to redress for discriminatory discharge,
reassignment, or refusal to hire cannot be easily answered in the ab-

80. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 5, § 4573(B)(4) (1979); Mo. COMM. RULES, 4 C.S.R. 180-3.060; MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4101 (1983); N.H. COMM. RULES, § 405.3.4.5.6; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(L) (Page Supp.
1984); OR. ADMIN. R. § 839-06-225; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 954(p), 955 (Purdon Supp.
1984-1985).
8 1. However, some agencies expressly forbid present discrimination against an employee on
the basis that a present nondisqualifying impairment may become disqualifying in the future. See,
e.g., W. VA. COMM. RULES, § 4.05.
82. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
83. Title VII expressly provides that observance of bona fide seniority systems, such as those
which may be contained in collective bargaining agreements, is not a violation of the civil rights
law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982); Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81-83. No similar provision is contained in the federal Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1982).

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10:3

stract. The answer in each case will depend on a wide variety of factors, including the particular statutory coverage applicable to the job,
the nature of the job, the present state of the employee's physical condition, and the present state of knowledge about AIDS. It is reasonable
to conclude that in most states with disability discrimination laws, as
well as in employment under federal contracts or in programs receiving
federal financial assistance (most ubiquitously, state and local government agencies, hospitals, and schools), protection against discrimination should extend to employees in categories I, II, or III who are physically able to work at jobs which do not require intimate physical
contact with coworkers or customers and which do not involve close,
continuous contact with infectious individuals suffering from communicable diseases transmissible by casual physical contact or respiration.
As AIDS research progresses, the protection afforded by present laws
will necessarily be adjusted to reflect new information about the disease's transmissibility and the factors bearing upon its progress in infected individuals.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The AIDS crisis presents a significant challenge to civil rights attorneys who are presented with clients whose particular problem may
not appear to be directly contemplated by the existing statutory scheme
in many jurisdictions. The unusual disease at issue does not always fit
neatly into the framework of present disability law, and members of
some of the "risk groups" involved (such as homosexuals and intravenous drug abusers) may not themselves be members of protected classes under existing civil rights laws in many jurisdictions. 84 This latter
problem is illustrated by cases in which employees have been subjected
to discharge when their sexual orientation or drug use was first discovered by their employer in connection with a diagnosis of AIDS.8 5 The
employee may have no redress if the stated reason for termination is
sexual orientation or drug abuse unless the employee's job is covered by
statutory protection on those bases. However, most cases to date have

84. Only one state, Wisconsin, forbids discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual
orientation, although many municipalities have adopted ordinances embodying such protection.
See generally E. BOGGAN, M. HAFT,C. LISTER, J. Rupp & T. STODDARD, AN ACLU HANDBOOK:
THE RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE (rev. ed. 1983). The federal Rehabilitation Act, in common with
many state laws, expressly excludes drug abusers from coverage under its employment provisions.
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
85. Most evidence that this occurs is anecdotal. However, in cases involving military personnel subject to immediate discharge under military regulations if their homosexuality is revealed, a
diagnosis of AIDS has led to immediate loss of employment and denial of employment-related
disability benefits. See AIDS LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 5, at 50-56; Comment, supra note I, at
733.
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centered on the disease itself as the provocation for the discrimination,
and innovative use of the existing statutory framework should provide
significant protection for many employees who suffer discrimination as
a result of the AIDS crisis.

